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RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION-AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
An infant, through his guardian ad litem, brought suit against the
executors of the estate of Wallace Beery to recover damages on an oral
contract allegedly made between the deceased and the mother of the plaintiff
for the benefit of the latter. In the agreement the deceased acknowledged
that he was the father of the plaintiff and obligated to support him. Deceased
agreed to secure two fully paid up insurance policies which would provide
the child a weekly income plus a lump sum payment when the child reached
the age of 21. In consideration the mother agreed (1) to forbear institution
of bastardy proceedings to establish deceased as father of the child, and
(2) to give the child Beery's Christian name. Defendant's demurrer was
sustained. Held, affirmed; the alleged promise of decedent was not supported
by consideration.' Schumm v. Berg, 224 P.2d 56 (Cal. App. 1950).
The common law imposes no legal obligation upon a putative father
to contribute to the support of an illegitimate child. 2 In the absence of
statute, the father cannot be compelled to support the child, 3 nor is his
promise to support, given in return for a promise to forbear from suing
him, deemed enforceable, since the natural and moral obligation of the father
to the child is insufficient consideration.4 The moral-consideration problem
rarely arises today because in most jurisdictions there is statutory imposition
of a legal duty upon the father to aid in the support of his bastard child. 5
1. The court reasoned that since CA.. Civ. CODE § 196a (1949) authorized the mother
to institute suit to enforce the obligation of the father to support his illegitimate child,
only on behalf of such child, the mother had no right to sue; therefore, her forbearing
from suit was not consideration for decedent's promise. 224 P.2d at 59. The naming of
the child for decedent was ruled out as consideration because the court could not conceive that this would be beneficial to Beery, or detrimental to the mother or child. Id. at
60, 61.
2. E.g., Carlson v. Bartels, 143 Neb. 680, 10 N.W.2d 671, 148 A. L. R. 658 (1943);
Schneider v. Kennat, 267 App. Div. 589, 47 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1st Dep't 1944) ; Brown v.
Brown, 183 Va. 353, 32 S.E.2d 79 (1944); 1 ScIEouL.R, MARRIAGE, DIvORcE, SEPARATION AND DommsTic RELATIONS § 709 (6th ed., Blakemore, 1921) ; 7 Am. JuR., Bastards
§ 69 (1937). See Note, 30 A.L.R. 1069 (1924).
3. In Kansas, a putative father is under a nonstatutory duty to support an
illegitimate child who is too young to care for himself. Here the old common law rule
is considered unadaptable to the needs of the people in light of the change of feeling
and opinion concerning bastards. See Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619,
30 A.L.R. 1065 (1923), setting the policy which was followed in Myers v. Anderson,
145 Kan. 775, 67 P.2d 542 (1937).
4. Mercer v. Mercer's Adm'r, 87 Ky. 30, 7 S.W. 401 (1888). But see Trayer v.
Setzer, 72 Neb. 845, 101 N.W. 989, 990 (1904). See Note, 39 A.L.R. 434 (1925).
5. E.g., CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. §§ 8178 et seq. (1949); Ky. REv. STAT. ANm.
§§ 406.010 et seq. (Baldwin 1943) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.18 et seq. (West 1947);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 11949 (Williams 1934).
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Where statutes are in force which give the mother a cause of action
for support of the child, the courts have unanimously held that consideration
for a putative father's promise to support is furnished by the detriment to
the mother in forbearing from the institution of filiation proceedings. But
where the claim of the mother has been subsequently lost, the forbearance
is not valid consideration. 7 If the statute gives the child a cause of action to
be brought by the mother and does not expressly deny the mother a power
to compromise, a distinction is often drawn between civil and criminal statutory remedies. 8 Where the action is regarded as civil the mother has the
power to compromise, 9 which, together with her promise to forbear suit,
affords consideration for a promise to support ;10 where the action is criminal,
the mother has no power to compromise. But no compromise which the
parents make can deprive the court of its statutory jurisdiction to protect
the child.11
The court in the instant case held that the cause of action did not
belong to the mother and that the statute neither expressly nor by interpretation authorized the mother to compromise the claim. 1 2 Nevertheless, it
is apparent that even under this type of statute the mother controls the institution of the suit and suffers legal detriment by foregoing suit, even though
a recovery would benefit only the child. Further, the court appears to have
overlooked the fact that a benefit to the promisor may be an aspect of consideration. Clearly a benefit resulted to the decedent in being spared implication in a law suit to establish him as the father of the child,la and this
benefit can be regarded as one of the .things for which he bargained.
6. E.g., Williams v. Amnann, 33 A.2d 633 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1943); Sybilla v. Connally, 66 Ga. App. 678, 18 S.E.2d 783 (1942); Redmon v. Roberts, 198 N.C. 161, 150
S.E. 881 (1929); Thayer v. Thayer, 189 N.C. 502, 127 S.E. 553, 39 A.L.R. 428 (1925).
See Note, 39 A.L.R. 434, 441 (1925).
7. Early v. Bradfield's Ex'x, 266 Ky. 395, 99 S.W.2d 190 (1936) (suit could not
be brought after child became 3 years of age); Smith v. Wagers' Adm'rs, 238 Ky.
609, 38 S.W.2d 685 (1931) (mother's marriage to another man barred claim).
8. See Burr v. Phares, 81 W.Va. 160, 94 S.E. 30, L.R.A. 1918D, 289 (1917). For
a collection of cases see Note, L.R.A. 1918D, 291. Generally if the purpose of the statute
is merely to aid the mother in forcing the father to contribute to the child's support,

the statute is said to be civil in nature. The statutes whose main purpose is to prevent
the illegitimate child from becoming a public charge as well as to punish the father
are criminal in nature. Statutes that combine these purposes are said to be quasi criminal. 7 Am. JuL-, Bastards § 81 (1937). See Borden v. State, 27 Ala. App. 271, 170 So.

98, 99 (1936) (civil) ; Brown v. Echtenkamp, 130 Neb. 297, 264 N.W. 757, 759 (1936)
(civil) ; Ray v. State, 231 Wis. 169, 285 N.W. 374, 376 (1939) (civil) ; Vail v. State,
17 Del. (1 Penne.) 8, 39 Atl. 451, 452 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1897) (criminal) ; Plunkard v.
State, 67 Md. 364, 10 Atl. 225, 226 (1887) (criminal); State v. Edens, 88 S.C. 302,
70 S.E. 609, 610 (1911) (criminal); State ex rel. Adkins v. Mefford, 75 Ohio App.
215, 61 N.E.2d 635, 636 (1944) (quasi criminal).
9. State ex rel. Rengstorf v. Weber, 102 Neb. 103, 166 N.W. 120 (1918).
10. Beattie v. Traynor, 114 Vt. 238, 42 A.2d 435, 159 A.L.R. 1399 (1945).
11. State v. Duncan, 222 N.C. 11, 21 S.E.2d 822 (1942).
12. See note 1 supra.
13. "If the defendant's testator, by this arrangement, relieved himself from all
statutory liability in which he was in imminent danger .. . if he was by this means
acquitted from a public prosecution, exposure and disgrace-to say nothing of the
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It is a universally accepted principle of law that, in the absence of fraud,
courts will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. 14 "Any valid
though slight consideration will support the most onerous obligation."' 15
Hence, it has been held that naming a child for a promisor is sufficient consideration to support a promise to confer a benefit upon the child ;16 and
the child as third party beneficiary can recover on the contract made by his
parents. 17 Such a contract contains both aspects of consideration, benefit to
the promisor and detriment to the promisee.' 8
The general purposes of bastardy statutes are to secure the support
and education of the child and to prevent such child from becoming a public
charge.' 9 It is apparent that, however the court in the instant case interpreted the statute, its decision is outside the general spirit and policy for
which the statute was passed, since the holding protects neither the mother,
the child nor the public.

CONTRIBUTION-JOINT TORTFEASORS-REMEDY GRANTED WHEN
TORT CONSISTS OF NEGLIGENCE
Roberts, driving a car borrowed from Garage, negligently collided
with Davis at an intersection. Davis was also negligent in failing to see
Roberts before entering the intersection. Garage obtained a joint judgment
against Davis and Roberts. Davis, being threatened with satisfaction of the
entire judgment, brought suit in Chancery Court, asking that he be allowed
trouble, loss of time, and pecuniary expense necessarily incidental of such a proceeding
.- who shall say that these considerations were not amply sufficient to bind him for the
amount which he himself . . . freely and understandingly elected to pay?" Hargroves
v. Freeman, 12 Ga. 342, 350 (1852).
14. Benward v. Automobile Ins. Co., 60 F. Supp. 995 (SD.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 155
F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1946); RESTATEMFNT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932). "This rule is almost
as old as the law of consideration itself. Therefore anything which fulfills the requirements of consideration will support a promise whatever may be the comparative value
of the consideration, and of the thing promised." 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 389 (Rev.
ed. 1936).
15. Taylor v. Taylor, 66 Cal. App. 2d 390, 152 P.2d 480, 484 (1944). This sentence
was written by the same justice who wrote the opinion in the instant case.
16. Wolford v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294 (1882); Daily v. Minnick, 117 Iowa 563, 91
N.W. 913, 60 L.R.A. 840 (1902). See, Freeman v. Morris, 131 Wis. 216, 109 N.W.
983, 984 (1906).
17. Gardner v. Denison, 217 Mass. 492, 105 N.E. 359, 51 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1108 (1914);
Eaton v. Libbey, 165 Mass. 218, 42 N.E. 1127 (1896). The court in the instant case
discussed these cases cited but held that since the courts relied on Parks v. Francis'
Adm'r, 50 Vt. 626 (1878), which upheld the proposition as a mere dictum, their
decisions do not support the proposition. 224 P.2d at 60. This is untenable in view of
the fact that courts subsequent to the Parks case relied on other authorities as well to
support the proposition. The opinion in the Wolford case recognized the Parks case
as a dictum, and the court in the Gardner case did not cite the Parks case.
18. "Defendant received the benefit of the name, and the parents parted with the
right to give the child such name as they might choose. This, as has been seen, is a
valuable consideration." Daily v. Minnick, 117 Iowa, 563, 91 N.W. 913, 915 (1902).
19. 7 Am. Jua., Bastards § 80 (1937).
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to pay half of the judgment and be released, or that he be allowed to pay the
entire judgment with a right over against Roberts for half the judgment.
Defendants' demurrer was overruled. Held (3-2),' affirmed; there may be
contribution in favor of a joint tortfeasor who is not guilty of an intended
or wilful wrong. Davis v. Broad Street Garage, 232 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn.
1950).
The historic common law viewpoint denies to joint tortfeasors any right
of indemnity or contribution. Merryweather v. Nixan,2 the case in which
that doctrine originated, did not actually state such a broad rule but merely
denied contribution where the parties, acting in concert, intentionally caused
harm to. a third person;3 but the rule was soon expanded to apply to all
tortfeasors, intentional and unintentional. 4 The rule has been supported on
the grounds that it tends to deter misconduct and wrongdoing, thai one
should not be permitted to make his own wrong for a basis for a cause of
action, 6 and that courts will not attempt to adjust differences between wrongdoers. 7 It has also been said that the rule is in accord with the basic theory
undar which contributory negligence is held to bar recovery. 8
The rule in its expanded form, which denies contribution even between
mere negligent tortfeasors, has been extensively criticized, 9 and the reasons
advanced for its support have been regarded as not persuasive.' 0 After all,
the right to contribution between co-obligors is a general principal of law,
1. Opinion by Burnett, J.; dissenting opinion by Tomlinson, J.
2. 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
3. See Reath, Contribution between Persons Jointly Charged for NegligenceMerryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARv. L. REv. 176 (1898).
4. See PROSSER, TORTS 1113 (1941).
5. See Thweatt's Adm'r v. Jones, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 328, 333 (1823); 1 COOLEY,
ToRTs 301 (4th ed. 1932). See Wade, Benefits Obtained under Illegal TransactionsReasons for and against Allowing Restitution, 25 TEXAS L. REv. 31 (1946), for an
amplified discussion of reasons given for refusal to grant relief in a similar and connected field.
6. See Manowitz v. Kanov, 107 N.J.L. 523, 154 AtI. 326, 328, 75 A.L.R. 1464
(1931) ; 1 COOLEY, TORTS 291 (4th ed. 1932).
7. See Avery v. Central Bank of Kansas City, 221 Mo. 71, 119 S.W. 1106, 1111
(1909); 1 COOLEY, TORTS 301 (4th ed. 1932).
8. See Note, 5 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 339, 342 (1931). Also see Fidelity & Cas. Co. v.
Chapman, 167 Ore. 661, 120 P.2d 223, 225 (1941) (stating that contribution would
practically mean adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence, which is not
recognized in that state). See James, Contribution among Joint Tortfeasors; A Praginatic Criticism, 54 HA~v. L. Rlv. 1156 (1941), also in support of the expanded rule
on the theory that to allow contribution would permit liability insurers by way of
subrogation to shift losses to individuals instead of absorbing these losses in the interests
of society.
9. PROSSER, TORTS 1114 (1941); RESTATEMIENT, RESTITUTION § 102, comment a
(1937) ; Berger, Contribution between Tortfeasors, 9 IND. L.J. 229 (1934); Bohlen,
Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNEL. L.Q. 552 (1936);
Gregory, Contribution among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1170
(1941) ; Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity between Tortifeasors, 81 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 130 (1932); Notes, 17 HAR. L. REV. 345 (1904), 16 MINN. L. REV. 73
(1931), 76 U. or PA. L. Rxv. 979 (1928) ; 27 MicH. L. REv. 478 (1929), 26 ORE. L. REV.
134 (1947), 3 WASH. & LE L. REv. 307 (1942) ; 24 YALE L.J. 257 (1915).
10. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 9.
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and the rule as to joint tortfeasors is merely an exception." Influenced
by the principle that one party should not be unjustly enriched at another's
expense, the courts in a number of instances have refused to apply the rule
that no relief can be granted between joint tortfeasors.
-These instances are frequently found in cases involving indemnity. 12
Thus, an employer who discharges a vicarious liability arising from the tort
of a servant is entitled to indemnity from the servant.13 Indemnity is also
allowed against a negligent supplier of goods in favor of another held liable
because of negligent reliance upon the former's care. 14 And where one is
employed or directed to do an act not "manifestly" wrong, but for which
he has been held responsible to a third party, he is entitled to indemnity
from the employer.' 5 There is also a right of indemnity against one primarily
negligent in creating a condition, from which injury results to a third party,
in favor of another who is only secondarily negligent in failing to detect
the condition.' 6 Indemnity has been allowed in favor of one only "passively"
negligent against another "actively" negligent.' 7 Some few courts have
applied the doctrine of "last clear chance" to permit indemnity against a
joint tortfeasor who had an opportunity to avoid the loss.' 8
The courts have also refused to apply the rule as to joint tortfeasors
in some cases involving contribution. For example, there may be contribution
between parties, who, jointly engaged in a lawful undertaking, have been
held liable only by inference of law for the tortious act of a third person.' 9
At least one court has applied this view to parties not acting jointly, when
their liability is vicarious, being based on the principle of respondeat sit11. See Reath, supra note 3.

12. The distinction between indemnity and contribution, sometimes confused by the
courts, is discussed in Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity among Tortfeasors, 26
TEXAS L. REv. 150 (1947).

13. E.g., Georgia S. & F. Ry. v. Jossey, 105 Ga. 271, 31 S.E. 179 (1898);

RE-

96 (1937).
14. E.g., Pfarr v. Standard Oil Co., 165 Iowa 657, 146 N.W. 851, L.R.A. 1915C
336 (1914) ; RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 93 (1937).
15. E.g., Horrabin v. City of Des Moines, 198 Iowa 549, 199 N.W. 988, 38 A.L.R.
STATEMENT, RESTITUTION §

554 (1924) ; RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 90 (1937).

16. E.g., Cohen v. Noel, 165 Tenn. 600, 56 S.W2d 744 (1933) ; see Union Stock
Yards Co. v. Chicago, B.&Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217, 228, 25 Sup. Ct. 226, 49 L. Ed. 453

(1905).

17. E.g., City of Astoria v. Astoria & C.R.R., 67 Ore. 538, 136 Pac. 645 (1913);
see Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434, 440, 187 S.W.2d 622, 625, 162 A.L.R. 571 (1945).
It seems that little help is derived from the use of such vague terms as "positive" or
"active" and "negative" or "passive." This is really only another way of expressing
the exception noted above. See note 9 supra.
18. E.g., Colorado & S. Ry. v. Western Light & Power Co., 73 Colo. 107, 214
Pac. 30 (1923); Nashua Iron & Steel Co. v. Worcester & N.R.R., 62 N.H. (4 Ladd)

159 (1882);

RESTATENMENT, RESTITUTION

§ 97 (1937).

19. Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 Atl. 815 (1918) (between two persons
who had jointly hired a negligent chauffeur); accord, Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn.
109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887) (between two persons who had jointly engaged a negligent
contractor); Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. (16 Smith) 218 (1870)
(between two counties jointly bound to keep bridge in repair) ; cf. Payne v. Charleston
Nat. Bank, 112 W. Va. 251, 164 S.E. 252 (1932).
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perior.20 A few courts have held that the rule against contribution does not
apply where the parties, through independent, concurring acts of negligence,
have unintentionally caused harm to a third person. 21 These courts have
22
said that if the party seeking contribution was not guilty of moral turpitude,
or if he did not know that the act for which he has been compelled to
respond was wrongful, 23 or if he is not presumed to have known that the
act was wrongful, 24 then contribution will not be denied. In the instant case
the Tennessee court apparently identifies itself with this group. However, a
greater number of the courts refuse to make a distinction between wilful and
negligent wrongdoers, and deny contribution between parties under a common
25
liability for concurring acts of negligence.
Dissatisfaction with the general rule has not been confined to that
expressed by the commentators or to that indicated by the judicial development of exceptions. Many states have enacted legislation allowing contribution. 26 Perhaps the most liberal statute on this subject is the Uniform
Contribution among Tortfeasors Act. 27 This Act allows contribution between
all tortfeasors on whom rests a common liability.2 8 It also contains an
optional provision, based on the theory of comparative negligence, allowing
20. George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942).

Compare Peake v. Ramsey, 43 A.2d 763 (Munic. Ct. D.C. 1945), holding that there
is no right of contribution between parties who personally participated in concurring
acts of negligence.
21. Underwriters at Lloyds of Minneapolis v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13
(1926); Western Cas. & Surety Co. v. Milwaukee General Const. Co., 213 Wis. 302,
251 N.W. 491 (1933); Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis. 591, 195 N.W. 855 (1923);
accord, Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 Atl. 231 (1928).
22. See Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048, 1053 (1918).
23. See Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 203, 205 (1853); Goldman v. MitchellFletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 Atl. 231, 234 (1928).
24. Underwriters at Lloyds of Minneapolis v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W.
13, 14 (1926); Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887); Armstrong
County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. (16 Smith) 218, 221 (1870). See 1 COOLEY, TORTS
299 (4th ed. 1932).
25. Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 195 Pac. 389 (1921); Public Service
Ry. v. Matteucci, 105 N.J.L. 114, 143 Atl. 221 (1928), 27 MICH. L. REv. 478 (1929);
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194, 75 A.L.R. 1481 (1930);
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Chapman, 167 Ore. 661, 120 P.2d 223 (1941); accord, Gobble
v. Bradford, 226 Ala. 517, 147 So. 619 (1933) ; Wallace v. Brende, 66 S.D. 582, 287 N.W.
328 (1939), aff'd, 67 S.D. 326, 292 N.W. 870 (1940) (now changed by statute); cf.
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Christenson, 183 Minn. 182, 236 N.W. 618 (1931) ; see Manowitz v. Kanov, 107 N.J.L. 523, 154 Atl. 326, 327, 75 A.L.R. 1464 (1931); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 102 (1937).
26. See, generally, Notes, 141 A.L.R. 1207 (1942), 122 A.L.R. 520 (1939), 85
A.L.R. 1091 (1933). Also see Note, 45 HARv. L. Rnv. 369 _(1931).
27. This Act has been adopted in Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, New
Mexico, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 32 (Supp. 1950).
28. 9 UN IFORN LAws ANN. 161, 162. No cases have been found allowing contribuiton between wilful tortfeasors, and most of the commentators would not extend
contribution this far. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 9, at 232. But see Bohlen, supra
note 9, at 566, and Leflar, supra note 9, at 139, 145, both urging that contribution should
not be restricted to negligence. Also see N.Y. LAw REv. COtM'N, 1936 REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 701, 705.
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apportionment between the tortfeasors when the evidence
degrees of fault. 29 A carefully drafted statute would seeem
satisfactory method of dealing with this problem, but in
legislation, the decision in the instant case seems to reach a
and is in accord with the current trend.30

shows unequal
to be the most
the absence of
desirable result

CREDITORS' RIGHTS-RECEIVERSHIP OF OPERATING BUSINESSCHATTEL, MORTGAGEE ENTITLED TO FORECLOSURE RATHER
THAN SMALLER MONTHLY PAYMENTS ORDERED BY COURT
The plaintiff sold to a partnership two cash registers on a title-retention,
chattel-mortgage basis with payments to aggregate $105 monthly. A receiver was later appointed for the partnership and the business continued
to be operated as a going concern. The plaintiff petitioned for immediate
possession of the machine or, in the alternative, for a sale in foreclosure of
its liens. The petition was denied, but the lower court directed that the receiver should make $50 monthly payments plus 57o of the decreasing monthly
balance. Plaintiff appealed. Held (3-2), reversed; the denial of the plaintiff's
right to enforce his liens was an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contract between the original parties.' National Cash Register Co. v.
Burns, 60 S.E.2d 615 (S.C. 1950).
The appointment of receivers is one of the prerogative functions of
equity, and it is deemed that the property of the debtor is held in custodia
legis for the benefit of all creditors concerned.' The receiver holds the property as a disinterested party for the benefit of whoever eventually establishes
claims thereto. 2 The orderly administration of justice requires that the
receiver be protected in his possession of the property, and any interference
without leave of the court will not be tolerated.3 But the authorities are in
almost universal agreement that a receiver takes the property subject to all
29. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 161, 162. See GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION
and Note, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 288 (1933), recom-

IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS 156 (1936),

mending such a provision.
30. As the dissenting opinion indicates, the precedent for such a result may be
doubtful. See Rhea v. White, 40 Tenn. 83 (1859). For a discussion of some of the
Tennessee cases on this subject, see 9 TENN. L. REv. 119 (1931).
1. E.g., Morthland v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 216 Ind. 689, 25 N.E.2d 325
(1940); Williams v. Messick, 177 Md. 605, 11 A.2d 472, 129 A.L.R. 1035 (1940);
Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md. 222, 9 Atl. 632 (1887); Gottwals v. Manske, 60 Nev.
76, 99 P.2d 645 (1940) ; 2 LAWRENCE, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1118 (1929) ; 53 C.J.,
Receivers § 118 (1931).
2. Central Appalachian Co. v. Buchanan, 90 Fed. 454 (6th Cir. 1898); Jennings
Sewer Dist. of St. Louis County v. Pitcairn, 238 Mo.App. 704, 187 S.W.2d 750 (1945);
HIGH, RECEIVERS § 1 (1876).
3. E.g., Lisanby v. Wilson 280 Ky. 768, 134 S.W.2d 651 (1939) ; Ex parte Niklaus,
144 Neb. 503, 13 N.W.2d 655 (1944); Nobles v. Roberson, 212 N.C. 334, 193 S.E.
420 (1937); James Freeman Brown Co. v. Harris, 88 S.C. 558, 70 S.E. 802 (1911).
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valid, existing liens.4 It has been said that the receiver stands in the shoes
of the debtor and can secure no greater rights than the insolvent had.5 Any
means of realizing his claim which the lien-holder had while his debtor was
solvent are not abolished by the appointment of a receiver.( Thus, there can
be no enforcement of a lien attaching to property in a receivership without
leave of court, but such leave will be freely given."
In the instant case, the creditor under the original contract with the
partnership reserved to himself the right to foreclose his lien upon default.
To deny one this right has been held by some courts to be an unconstitutional
impairment of the obligation of contract.8 Many courts, however, have qualified this limitation by holding that the right of the lien-holder or mortgagee is
remedial only.9 To change the reserved remedy when others, though less
convenient or speedy, are available, is not unconstitutional. 10 The qualification is predicted on the premise that it is within the discretion of a court
of equity to replace a reserved remedy to protect the property within its
control." The majority of the court in the instant case recognized the power
of discretion to preserve the property but made its exercise subject to the
2
constitutional limitation.'
The mere fact that a receiver is appointed is not per se a breach of the
original contract. 13 The receiver should have a reasonable time in which
4. E.g., In re Caswell Const. Co., 13 F.2d 667 (N.D.N.Y. 1926); Parsons v. Third
Nat Co., 230 Mo. App. 1114, 94 S.W.2d 1057 (1936) ; Sumner Iron Works v. Wolten,
61 Wash. 689, 112 Pac. 1109 (1911); 1 CLARx, REcEIVERS § 354 (2d ed. 1929); 2
LAWRENCE, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1118 (1929).
5. This is not true of a trustee in bankruptcy. The trustee represents both debtor
and creditor and has more extensive rights and powers than an ordinary receiver
possesses. BANKRUPTcY AcT § 70, as amnended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 (Supp. 1950).
6. Nick v. Holtz, 237 Wis. 407, 297 N.W. 387 (1941); First Nat. Bank v. Cook,
12 Wyo. 492, 76 Pac. 674 (1904); 45 Am. JuL., Receivers § 156 (1943).
7. Bolich v. Prudential Ins. Co., 202 N.C. 789, 164 S.E. 335, 82 A.L.R. 974 (1932);
Pelletier v. Greenville Lumber Co., 123 N.C. 596, 31 S.E. 855, 68 Am. St. Rep. 837
(1898).

8. E.g:, Brown v. Ferdon, 5 Cal.2d 226, 54 P.2d 712 (1936); Phildelphia Trust

Co. v. Northumberland County Traction Co., 258 Pa. 152, 101 Atl. 970 (1917); Galey
v. Guffey, 248 Pa. 523, 94 AtI. 238 (1915). "The constitutional provision . . . forbidding
the impairment of the obligation of contracts, lays its hand on the legislative department
of the government, but the principle has like force when invoked for a similar purpose
in the judicial department." Phildelphia Trust Co. v. Northumberland County Traction
Co., supra at 974. "It is true that what is prohibited is legislative action the effect
of which would be the impairment of a contract; but what the Legislature may not
do in this regard certainly the courts may not do. The power that is here denied the
Legislature was not reserved to the courts." Galey v. Guffey, supra at 240.
9. Western Powder Mfg. Co. v. Interstate Coal Co., 13 F. Supp. 77 (E.D. Ill.
1936) ; It re Hasie,. 206 Fed. 789 (N.D. Tex. 1913) ; Mahood v. Bessemer Properties,
Inc., 154 Fla. 710, 18 So. 2d 775, 153 A.L.R. 1199 (1944) ; Guardian Depositors Corp.
v. Brown, 290 Mich. 433, 287 N.W. 798 (1939). "The remedy may be altered without
impairing the obligation of his contract. . .

."

In re Jersey Island Packing Co., 138

Fed. 625, 627 (9th Cir. 1905).
10. Henderson v. Weber, 131 N.J.L. 299, 35 A.2d 609 (1944).
11. See 60 S.E.2d at 619 (dissenting opinion).

12. 60 S.E.2d at 618.
13. Diamond State Iron Co. v. San Antonio & A.P. Ry., 11 Tex. Civ. App. 587,
33 S.W. 987 (1895); 45 Am. Ju., Receivers § 138 (1943). But see Pennsylvania
Steel Co, v. New York City Ry., 198 Fed. 721 (2d Cir, 1912),
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to elect to perform or disregard existing contracts, whichever is more beneficial to the interests which he serves.14 The failure of the court in the
instant case to discuss this point implies the view that the constitutional
limitation is absolutely binding on the court, regardless of the facts of a
particular case.
Certainly, the facts of the instant case reveal strong circumstances warranting a relaxation of the constitutional limitation. It appears that the
receiver was operating the business at a profit and was continuing to pay
monthly notes at a rate only slightly less than the plaintiff had demanded.' 5
At the rate proposed, the full purchase price would have been satisfied in
two years on machines which according to testimony had a life of approximately ten years.' 6 Thus, the security of the chattel mortgage was as
adequate as when the partnership held the property before receivership.
In light of these facts it seems feasible to delay the lien-holder's right to
an immediate realization of his claim. If the receiver subsequently defaults
or if the value of the security is reduced below the unpaid portion of the
debt, the creditor still has his remedy readily enforceable in the courts. This
result would adequately protect the interest of the lien-holder and would
at the same time better enable the receivership to accomplish its business
purpose.

EVIDENCE-DEAD MAN STATUTE-OBSERVATION OF PHYSICAL
CONDITIONS NOT A "TRANSACTION" WITHIN MEANING OF STATUTE
Suit for injuries received from a fall which occurred when entering
defendant's store. Plaintiff alleged that because of improper lighting and
absence of warning signs she had failed to notice that the floor was on a
lower level than the door sill. While the action was pending, ddfendani
died, and the action was revived against her executrix. From a judgment
for plaintiff below, the executrix assigned as error the admission of
plaintiff's testimony as to the condition of the building, contending
that the plaintiff was incompetent to testify under the "Dead Man Statute."'
Held, affirmed. Plaintiff's testimony as to the defects of the property was
14. See United States Trust Co. v. Wabash Western Ry., 150 U.S. 287, 299, 14

Sup. Ct. 86, 37 L. Ed. 1085 (1893); Wells v. Hartford Manilla Co., 76 Conn. 27, 55
Atl. 599, 603 (1903); 2 LAWRENcE, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1122 (1929).

15. See 60 S.E.2d at 620 (dissenting opinion).
16. Ibid.

1. "In actions or proceedings by or against executors, administrators, or guardians,
in which judgments may be rendered for or against them, neither party shall be allowed
to testify against the other as to any transaction with or statement by the testator, interstate, or ward, unless called to testify thereto by the opposite party. . .
CODE ANN. § 9780 (Williams Supp. 1950).

.'!
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based on her own observation and did not relate to any "transaction" with
the deceased; therefore the testimony is not within the statute. Nernian v.
Tipton, 234 S.W.2d 994 (Tenn. 1950).
At common law a party to an action, or a person interested in the result
thereof, was not a competent witness. 2 This was based on the belief that
most people who had an interest in the result of a case were likely to speak
falsely; therefore the testimony of such persons was excluded.8 Today,
however, most jurisdictions have abolished by statute the general rule of
disqualification for interest, but a trace of the old rule remains in the form
of so-called "Dead Man Statutes." In general these statutes exclude the
testimony of a surviving party when the testimony relates to a "transaction
or statement" with the decedent. 5 The legislative policy behind the statutes,
a remnant of the common law rule, is that of preventing a surviving party
from obtaining undue advantage over the successors in interest of the
deceased. If the surviving party should testify falsely, there would be no
6
one to contradict him.
Most jurisdictions have held that the statutes apply to tort as well as
to contract actions. 7 Some courts hold that since the statutes change the
common law rule, they must be construed strictly against allowing the
testimony to be heard." Others, doubting the expediency of the statutes,
construe them liberally in favor of allowing the testimony, and enforce them
only when the case is brought strictly within their terms.0 The courts
arrive at their different constructions by determining what the term "trans2. 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 327 (16th ed., Wigmore, 1899) ; 3 JONES, EVIDENCE IN
CIVIL CASES § 712 (4th ed. 1938).
3. 2 WIG toE, EVIDENCE § 576 (3d ed. 1940).
4. 2 id. § § 577, 578; 3 JONES, EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES § 772 (4th ed. 1938).
5. MINtium STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTArIoN; 338 (Vanderbilt ed. 1949).

This treatise sets forth a recommended rule, and shows how the various state statutes
differ from it. The statute of Connecticut is suggested as a model, CONN. REV. GEN.
STAT. § § 7895-96 (1949)' See also 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 488 (3d ed. 1940) (statutes
collected).
6. Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn. App. 220, 142 S.W.2d 737 (W.S. 1940); 3 JONES,
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES § 773 (4th ed. 1938) ; 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 578 (3d ed.
1940).
7. Wright v. Wilson, 154 F.2d 616, 170 A.L.R. 1237 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied sub
non. Wright v. Lohr, Adm'x, 329 U.S. 743 (1946) (court expresses dissatisfaction with
the statutory rule); Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Davidson, 225 Ala. 171, 142
So. 63 (1932); Van Meter v. Goldfarb, 317 Ill. 620, 148 N.E. 391 (1925); Hallowach
v. Priest, 113 Me. 510, 95 Atl. 146 (1915) ("The statute makes no distinction between
actions of contract and actions of tort"). But cf. Louisville N.A. & C. Ry. v. Thompson,
107 Ind. 442, 9 N.E. 357 (1886) (statute said not to apply to tort cases resulting in
death); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Clark's Adm'x, 257 Ky. 724, 79 S.W.2d 21, 97
A.L.R. 971 (1934) (statute amended to except specifically from its provision the evidence
of persons testifying for themselves in tort actions).
8. E.g., Brown v. Adams, 174 N.C. 490, 93 S.E. 989, L.R.A. 1918C 911 (1917).
9. Poulson v. Stanley, 122 Cal. 655, 55 Pac. 605 (1898); Durham v. Shannon, 116
Ind. 403, 19 N.E. 190 (1888); McDonald v. Miller, 73 N.D. 474, 16 N.W.2d 270 (1944)
(court expressly refused to extend the statute by interpretation); St. John v. Lofland,
5 N.D. 140, 64 N.W. 930 (1895) (good discussion of the fallacies of the statutes) ; Baker
v. Baker, 24 Tenn. App. 220, 142 S.W.2d 737 (W.S. 1940).

RECENT CASES

1951 ]

action" means, 10 and no working definition of the term can be drawn from
the cases.
In the instant case the court held that the statute applied to tort actions,
but found that the plaintiff's act in observing the defects of the building
was not a "transaction" within the statute because it was an act in which
the decedent did not participate." This seems to be a situation where
the statute should be held not to apply, and especially so in Tennessee,
where the courts have expressly held that the statute will be construed against
2
the exclusion of the testimony and in favor of its admission.'
13
In response to sharp criticisms of the statutes by leading textwriters,
advocating their abolition or modification, 14 some states have gone far in
the direction of legislative modification.' 5 The evil guarded against by the
statutes does not justify the rule. If a person has a claim against a decedent,
based upon facts known only to him and the decedent, he is in effect left
without remedy if he is forbidden to testify to those facts. Furthermore,
if a dishonest claim is brought against the estate of the decedent, the
weapon of cross-examination and the scrutiny of the jury should be ample
to defeat it. The purpose of the rule was to prevent robbing the decedent's
estate, not to prevent honest claims from being brought against it.

10. Wheeler v. McKeon, 137 Minn. 92, 162 N.W. 1070, 1 A.L.R. 1514 (1917);
Van Wagenen v. Bonnot, 74 N.J. Eq. 843, 70 At. 143, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 400 (1908);
Brown v. Adams, 174 N.C. 490, 93 S.E. 989, L.R.A. 1918C 911 (1917). See 3 JONES,
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES 785 (4th ed. 1938) (see footnotes for acts that have been held
to constitute "transactions" within the various statutes) ; 58 Amx. JUR., Witnesses § 238
(1948); Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 481, 511 (1946)
(examples of injustice of the rule).
11. Krause v. Emmons, 6 Boyce 104, 97 Atl. 238 (Del. Super. Ct. 1916) (witness
permitted to testify to physical facts learned from his own observation); McCarthy v.
Woolston, 210 App. Div. 152, 205 N.Y. Supp. 507 (4th Dep't 1924) ; Seligman v. Orth,
205 Wis. 199, 236 N.W. 115 (1931).
12. Grange Warehouse Ass'n v. Owen, 86 Tenn. 355, 365, 7 S.W. 457 (1888) ; Hill
v. McLean, 78 Tenn. 107, 114-15 (1882) ; Hughlett v. Conner, 59 Tenn. 83, 88 (1873);
Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn. App. 220, 231, 142 S.W.2d 737 (W.S. 1940).

13. 2

WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE

§ 578 (3d ed. 1940). The author states that the present

rule is open to every objection which was successfully urged against the interest-rule in
general.
14. MORGAN et al., LAW OF EVIDENCE 23 et seq. (1927) ; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE,
Rule 101 (1942).
15. CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. § § 7895-96 (1949) (allows surviving party to testify,
but hearsay evidence is admissible on behalf of the decedent as to the subject in issue) ;
N.H. RE v. LAws c. 392, § § 25-26 (1942) (admits survivor's testimony when the court
thinks an injustice would be done without it) ; N.M. STATE ANN. § 20-205 (1941) (surviving party may testify, but no recovery allowed unless the party's testimony is corroborated by other material witnesses) ; see MINIm!Um STANDARDS OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION 338 (Vanderbilt ed. 1949).
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EVIDEN(E-JUDICIAL NOTICE-TENETS OF COMMUNIST PARTY
Defendant, charged with violation of a court order restraining picketing by violence, was asked on cross-examination if he was a member of
the Communist Party. For his refusal to answer this question, he was convicted of summary contempt. He appealed on the ground that the court
abused its discretion in permitting irrelevant and immaterial questions
concerning his political affiliations. Held, affirmed. It is common knowledge that membership in the Communist Party would tend to induce a
witness to lie under such circumstances as appear in this case. Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, 92

N.E.2d 431 (Ohio App. 1950).
The extent to which the 'courts will take judicial notice of the tenets
of the Communist Party has been open to controversy for the last thirty
years.' In a case decided in 1920, a federal district court held that there
was not enough evidence presented to support a finding that a purpose of
the Communist Party was to overthrow the United States Government by
force.2 On appeal, however, the decision was reversed on the ground that
there was sufficient evidence to sustain such a finding. 3 Shortly thereafter,
another court announced a similar holding,4 and a series of immigration
cases on the West Coast in the early 1930's were to the same effect., Although these holdings do not specifically reject the possibility that a court
may take judicial notice of the purposes of the Communist Party in the
absence of any evidence, there is at least an implication in each case that
some evidence as to those purposes must be presented. Since then, the
courts of California and Washington have expressly refused to take judicial
notice of the tenets of the Communist Party;O and a federal district court
has held that the term "Communist," as applied to a political party, does
not in and of itself mean that the party advocates force and violence. 7 As
recently as 1948 it was held to be "common knowledge" that not all Communists advocate forceful overthrow of the Government.8
One of the first courts to take judicial notice of the tenets of the
Communist Party was the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 1924,9
1. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 90 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).

2.
3.
4.
5.

Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 1920).
Skefflngton v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129 (1st Cir. 1922).
Antolish v. Paul, 283 Fed. 957 (7th Cir. 1922).
Sormunen v. Nagle, 59 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1932); Saksagansky v. Weedin, 53

F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1931); Ex parte Vilarino, 50 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1931); Kenmotsu
v. Nagle, 44 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 832 (1931).
6. Communist Party of United States v. Peek, 20 Cal.2d 536, 127 P.2d 889 (1942);
State ex rel. Huff v. Reeves, 5 Wash.2d 637, 106 P.2d 729, 130 A.L.R. 1465 (1940).
7. Feinglass v. Reinecke, 48 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Ill. 1942).
8. State ex rel. Beck v. Hummel, 150 Ohio St. 127, 80 N.E.2d 899 (1948).

9. Ungar v. Seamen, 4 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1924).
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followed in the First Circuit in 1931.10 And while the federal courts
on the West Coast were apparently requiring evidence of the tenets, 1 the
federal courts in the East were taking judicial notice of them.' 2 The
Michigan Supreme Court took judicial notice that the red flag was an
emblem, advocate and teacher of anarchy, 13 and two very recent decisions
in New York and Ohio dearly held that the tenets of the Communist Party
-the use of force and violence in the overthrow of the Government-are
4
matters of common knowledge.1
The court in the instant case, in holding that membership in the Communist Party may be a basis for impeachment of a witness, necessarily
took judicial notice that the Communist Party advocates force and violence.
It is well settled that anything affecting a witness' credibility may be brought
out on cross-examination,' 5 subject to the sound discretion of the court.'
The present court felt that the circumstances of the case-union violencein conjunction with what it felt was commonly known about the Communist
Party, would have an effect on a Communist witness' veracity.
The particular problem raised by this case is not likely to arise again.
The recently enacted Smith Act has made it a criminal offense to be a
member of any organization which advocates the overthrow of the United
States Government by force.' 7 To compel an answer to the question put
in the instant case would now violate a witness' privilege against selfincrimination, since an answer could furnish "a link in the chain of evidence"
needed in a prosecution for violation of the Act.' 8 Rather than settling
the broad problem of judicial notice of the tenets of the Communist Party,
however, passage of the Smith Act only provides a new opportunity for
raising that problem.
10. Murdoch v. Clark, 53 F2d 155 (1st Cir. 1931).
11. See note 5 supra.
12. United States ex rel. Fernandas v. Commissioner of Immigration, 65 F.2d 593
(2d Cir. 1933); United States ex reL. Yokinen v. Commissioner of Immigration, 57
F. 2d 707 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 607 (1932); United States ex reL.
Fortmueller v. Commissioner of Immigration, 14 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
13. People v. Immonen, 271 Mich. 384, 261 N.W. 59 (1935).
14. Weinstock v. Ladisky, 197 Misc. 859, 98 N.Y.S.2d 85, 102 (Sup. Ct. 1950)
("The ruthlessness and unscrupulousness of the Communists and their skill in the use
of deception to advance their cause is also a matter of common knowledge") ; Dworken
v. Cleveland Board of Education, 94 N.E.2d 18 (Ohio C.P. 1950).
15. Massman v. Muehlebach, 231 Mo. App. 72, 95 S.W.2d 808 (1936); Glass v.
Bosworth, 113 Vt. 303, 34 A.2d 113 (1943) ; 58 Am. Jun., Witnesses § 676 (1948).
16. Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
694 (1941) ; State v. Shults, 43 N.M. 71, 85 P.2d 591 (1938).
17. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (1951).
18. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 71 Sup. Ct. 223 (1950). This was a ground
of defendant's appeal in the instant case but the court struck it down because the Smith
Act had not taken effect.
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FEDERAL COURTS-HABEAS CORPUS IN EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGSNECESSITY OF EXHAUSTING REMEDIES IN STATE COURTS
Pursuant to an extradition warrant issued by the Governor of Missouri, petitioner, an escaped convict from Georgia, was held in custody for
rendition to an agent of the latter state. Apparently without resort to the
Missouri courts, petitioner procured a writ of habeas corpus in a federal
court in Missouri upon the ground that the extradition warrant was void.
He alleged that his conviction and chain gang punishment in Georgia were
in violation of his rights under the Federal Constitution and the Constitution of Georgia, and that his return to Georgia would result in further cruel
and unusual punishment and would place his life in jeopardy. After trial,
the court discharged the writ for want of jurisdiction, and petitioner appealed.
Held, affirmed. Before seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court,
a prisoner in custody under an extradition warrant must exhaust his state
remedies. It was indicated that the remedies to be exhausted are those of
the asylum state, and that the legality of the prisoner's original or impending
detention in the demanding state must be determined there, after his return.
Davis v. O'Connell, 185 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1950).
A federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus in favor of one who
is in state custody in violation of the Federal Constitution, laws or treaties.1
However, issuance of the writ is discretionary. 2 As a matter of comity,8 it
has become settled that this discretion ordinarily will be exercised in favor
of issuance of the writ only after the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies, 4 although, in certain exceptional cases of "peculiar urgency," such
exhaustion of remedies is not a prerequisite to issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus by a federal court.5 These general principles have found specific ap1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (1950).

2. Ex pare Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 Sup. Ct. 734, 29 L. Ed. 868 (1886); United
cert denied, 339
U.S. 980 (1950) (by implication); see Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 181, 27 Sup.
Ct. 459, 51 L. Ed. 760 (1907) ; Dobie, Habeas Corpus in the Federal Courts, 13 VA.
L. REv. 433, 446 (1927).
3. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 70 Sup. Ct. 587, 94 L. Ed. 761 (1950), 99
U. OF PA. L REv. 249; 40 J. Crm. L. & CRItIOLOGY 484 (1949).
4. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 70 Sup. Ct. 587, 94 L. Ed. 761 (1950), 50 COL.
L. REv. 856, 41 J. CUm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 2 STAN. L. Rev. 788, 99 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 249; Ex pare Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 64 Sup. Ct. 448, 88 L. Ed. 572 (1944);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 Sup. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791 (1935), 35 COL. L.
REv. 282, 25 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943; Gordon v. Scudder, 163 F.2d 518 (9th Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 830 (1947). As to what constitutes exhaustion of state
remedies, see Notes, 61 HARv. L. REv. 657 (1948), 94 L. Ed. 785 (1950), 88 L. Ed.
576 (1944), 34 MINN. L. REv. 653 (1950); 39 J. CrM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 357 (1948).
5. E.g., Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 27 Sup. Ct. 122, 51 L. Ed. 161
(1906) (need for speedy determination after long delay); In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372,
10 Sup. Ct. 584, 33 L. Ed. 940 (1890) (offense cognizable in federal courts only);
Potter v. Dowd, 146 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 1944) (state's denial of counsel to indigent,
ignorant defendant made state remedies unavailable), 58 HARV. L. REv. 456 (1945),
39 ILL. L. Rev. 417 (1945) ; Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1931) (petiStates ex rel. Jackson v. Ruthazer, 181 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1950),
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plication in the ordinary case of an attack upon custody pursuant to an
extradition warrant.6
The normal scope of inquiry by a court asked to free a prisoner held
for extradition covers four problems: (1) the correctness of the requisition
papers; (2) the identity of the prisoner; (3) whether the prisoner is a
fugitive; and (4) whether a crime is substantially charged in the demanding
state. 7 Generally, the federal courts have been assiduous in thus limiting
their inquiry to the legality of the detention for extradition." The legality
of such detention being a matter which concerns the asylum state rather
than the demanding state, it seems that the remedies of the asylum state
are the remedies which must be exhausted before seeking the aid of a federal
court in gaining release from custody under an extradition warrant.
In 1949, the Third Circuit, in Johnson v. Dye,9 departed from orthodox
procedure to release from the custody of Pennsylvania authorities an escaped
Georgia convict who had exhausted neither his asylum- nor demandingstate remedies, because of the cruel and unusual nature of his original and
impending punishment in the demanding state. The Supreme Court reversed
in a memorandum opinion, 10 citing only Ex parte Hawk," which was not
an extradition case, but which did require exhaustion of the state remedies
available to a prisoner before a federal court would entertain a petition
tioner would have been executed before state remedies exhausted); United States ex
rel. Bongiorno v. Ragen, 54 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Ill. 1944), aff'd, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 865 (1945) (policy of state prison authorities made state
remedies unavailable); see Notes, 94 L. Ed. 785 (1950), 88 L. Ed. 576 (1944), 34
MINN. L. REv. 653, 656-58 (1950).
6. E.g., Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 27 Sup. Ct. 459, 51 L. Ed. 760 (1907) ;
see Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 225, 27 Sup. Ct. 122, 51 L. Ed. 161 (1906) ;
see Sutherland, Due Process and Cruel Planishinent,64 HAv. L. R-v. 271 (1950). The
rule of exhaustion of state remedies has been given statutory form to the extent of
its application to "custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. . . ." 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2254 (1950). For confirmation of the position that this statute does not cover extradition cases, see Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943, 954 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
7. See Biddinger v. Commissioner, 245 U.S. 128, 38 Sup. Ct. 41, 62 L. Ed. 193
(1917) ; Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 35 Sup. Ct. 137, 59 L. Ed. 302 (1914) ; Johnson
v. Matthews, 182 F.2nd 677 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950) ; Notes,
47 COL. L. REv. 470, 471 (1947), 2 STAN. L. REv. 174 (1949) ; 2 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 246
(1934).
8. Biddinger v. Commissioner, 245 U.S. 128, 38 Sup. Ct. 41, 62 L. Ed. 193 (1917);
Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 35 Sup. Ct. 137, 59 L. Ed. 302 (1914); Johnson v.
Matthews, 182 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 828 (1950); Hale
v. Crawford, 65 F.2d 739 (1st Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 674 (1933), 33 COL
L. REV. 1259, 22 GEo. L.J. 370 (1934), 2 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 246 (1934) ; see Notes, 2
(based on Hale v. Crawford,
STAN. L. REv. 174 (1949), 43 YALE L.J. 444 (1934)
supra).
9. 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949) ; accord, Harper v. Wall, 85 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.J.
1949); see Ex parte Marshall, 85 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.J. 1949); Note, 2 STAN. L. REv.
174 (1949). For a discussion of this and other modern applications of the constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, see Note, 4 VAND. L. Rav. 680
(1951).
10. 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
11. 321 U.S. 114, 64 Sup. Ct. 448, 88 L. Ed. 572 (1944).
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for habeas corpus. Thus, the memorandum opinion in Johnson v. Dye has,
apparently quite properly, been interpreted as requiring exhaustion of some
one state's remedies before a federal court will issue a writ of habeas corpus
in favor of a prisoner held for extradition, but as not touching the question,
raised by the Third Circuit, of the scope of inquiry on extradition. " If this
interpretation is correct, the decision left unsettled (1) what state's remedies
must be exhausted, and (2) whether, in extradition cases, the federal courts
will look to the legality of the conviction and original or impending detention
in the demanding state. On the latter question, the affirmative answer of the
3
Third Circuit has acquired some following.'
In light of this history, the instant case seems sound in its summary of
the procedure to be followed in the ordinary case where one held pursuant
to an extradition warrant seeks a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court.
The petitioner must exhaust his remedies in the asylum state before seeking
the aid of the federal courts of that state. Once in federal court, only the
legality of the detention for extradition will be considered. 14 The legality
of the conviction or detention in the demanding state is a matter to be determined in the courts of that state ;15 it is not a proper consideration in extradition proceedings. The petitioner who would raise this question must
exhaust his remedies in the demanding state; if the latter remedies are
inadequate, he then may resort to the federal courts of the demanding state.
12. Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Sutherland,
Due Process and Cruel Punishment, 64 HARv. L. REv. 271, 274-75 (1950); 40 J.
CRm. L. & CmIMINOLOGY 484 (1949).
13. Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Harper v.
Wall, 85 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.J. 1949); cf. Ex parte Marshall, 85 F. Supp. 771 (D.N.J.
1949) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Mattox v. Superintendent, 152 Pa. Super. 167, 31 A 2"d
576 (1943); see Sutherland, Due Process and Cruel Punishment, 64 HARv. L. REv.
271, 277-79 (1950); Notes, 47 CoL. L. REv. 470 (1947), 2 STAN. L. REv. 174 (1949),
4 VAND. L. REv. 680 (1951), 43 YALE L.J. 444 (1934). [Since this has been set in
type, the court of appeals has apparently refuted the position of the Middlebrooks case,
supra, stating that comity requires that the courts of the demanding state be given
first opportunity to consider these questions. Ross v. Middlebrooks, 19 U.S.L. WEEK
2514 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1951).]
14. Even without its expression, this conclusion would appear implicit in the holding.
The court states that remedies of the asylum state must be exhausted. 185 F.2d at 517.
Under the orthodox rule, there is no remedy in the asylum state for illegal conviction
and/or detention in the demanding state. See discussion supra. Surely, the federal
courts will not require exhaustion of that which does not exist. Thus, merely by requiring exhaustion of remedies in the asylum state, the court in effect refuses to consider
the legality of the conviction and/or detention in the demanding state, leaving this question for determination in proper proceedings in the state and federal courts of the demanding state.
15. See Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 828 (1950) ; Hale v. Crawford, 65 F._d 739, 744 (1st Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
290 U.S. 674 (1933), 33 COL. L. REv. 1259, 22 Gao. L.J. 370 (1934), 2 GEo. WASU. L.
REv. 246 (1934); cf. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 68 Sup. Ct. 1443, 92 L. Ed. 1898
(1948) ; see Note, 43 YALE L.J. 444 (1934).
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IMPLIED WARRANTY-WARRANTY OF SEAWORTHINESS-WARRANTY
WITHOUT A SALE
Plaintiff, a longshoreman employed by an independent contractor to
load a vessel, brought suit against the owner of the vessel for damages
arising out of personal injuries sustained on the dock due to the failure of
defendant's tackle. Plaintiff alleged negligence and unseaworthiness of the
tackle, and judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff upon the latter allegation. Held (2-1), affirmed. Although a breach of the obligation to furnish
a seaworthy vessel and gear gives rise to an action in tort rather than
contract, such action is cognizable by the maritime law whether it occurs on
land or at sea. Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555 (2d
Cir. 1950).
Warranties are generally thought of as contractual in nature' and are
most often related to sales transactions. Because of this, it is often held that
where a sale does not exist, such as where food is served in a restaurant 2
or where goods are obtained in a self-service store before payments there
can be no warranty. However, since warranties are not necessarily confined
to sales or contracts,4 some courts have shown a tendency to recognize

1. Bank of Montreal v. Thayer, 7 Fed. 622 (C.C.D. Iowa 1881); Gay Oil Co.
v. N.M. Roach, 93 Ark. 454, 25S.W. 122, 27 L.R.A. (N.s.) 914, 137 Am. St. Rep. 95

(1910); Sibley Lumber Co. v. Schultz, 297 Mich. 206, 297 N.W. 243 (1941); Hoover
v. Utah Nursery Co., 79 Utah 12, 7 P.2d 270 (1932); Houston v. Lawhead, 116 W.
Va. 652, 182 S.E. 780 (1935); 1 WiLLIsToN, SALES § 195 (Rev. ed. 1948); 55 C.J.,
Sales § 668 (1931). Some courts will still permit an action for breach of warranty
to be brought in tort without proof of intentional misrepresentation or negligence.
Shippen v. Bowen, 122 U.S. 575, 7 Sup. Ct 1283, 30 L. Ed. 1172 -(1887); Farrell v.
Manhattan Market Co., 198 Mass. 271, 84 N.E. 481 (1908); Standard Paint Co. v.
E.K. Victor Co., 120 Va. 595, 91 S.E. 752 (1917); Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Market,
121 W. Va. 605, 5 S.E.2d 785 (1939) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 82 (1941). Contra: Slack v.
Bragg, 83 Vt 404, 76 Atl. 148 (1910).
2. E.g., Merrill v. Hudson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 AtI. 533, L.R.A. 1915B (1914);
Nisky v. Childs Co., 103 N.J.L. 464, 135 Atl. 805, 50 A.L.R. 227 (1947), 12 CORNELL
L.Q. 535, 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 676; see, Yeo v. Pig & Whistle Sandwich Shops, 62
S.E.2d 668, 670 (Ga. App. 1950); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 242b (Rev. ed. 1948); 55
C.J., Sales § 669 (1931). The modem trend permitting an implied warranty to arise in
transactions involving the serving of food is well illustrated by the following cases.
Amdal v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 84 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Iowa 1949); Goetten v. Owl
Drug Co., 6 Cal.2d 683, 59 P2d 142 (1936); Stanfield v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 143
Kan. 117, 53 P.2d 878 (1936); Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 465, 120
N.E. 407 (1918), 28 YALE L.J. 294 (1919); Temple v. Keeler, 238 N.Y. 344, 144
N.E. 635, 35 A.L.R. 920 (1924); John B. Thompson Co. v. Smith, 8 Tenn. Civ. App.

95 (1917).

3. E.g., Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores, 319 Mass. 224, 65 N.E.2d 305 (1946),
41 ILL. L. Ray. 676 (1947) (plaintiff injured when bottle of tonic exploded before it
had been paid for) ; Note, 27 YAI L.J. 1068 (1918).
4. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 242b (Rev. ed. 1948).
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warranties in three other groups of cases-those involving bailments, 5 the
service of food 6 and the authority of agents. 7
There would seem to be no basis for confining warranties within the
law of contracts.8 Historically, a breach of warranty was first recognized as
a tort,9 and it was not until 1778 that a breach of warranty action brought
in assumpsit was first reported. 10 Furthermore, implied warranties arise by
operation of law, there being no contract whatsoever, and even express
warranties are more often mere statements of fact than promises of indemnity.11
Implied warranties of seaworthiness of vessel and gear have long been
12
recognized in contract actions by seamen for injuries sustained at sea.
The instant case definitely places such an action on a warranty within the
category of torts,' 3 and allows recovery by a longshoreman injured on a dock.
The case of Silverman v. Imperial London Hotels,'4 which allowed recovery
on a breach of an implied warranty that defendant's premises would be fit
for use as a Turkish bath, is in some respects similar to the instant case.
Neither case involves a sale nor fits into the three groups of cases where
the courts have extended the doctrine of warranties; both involve a furnishing
of materials and services of such a nature that, as in the case of the service
of food, public policy would seem to favor the recognition of a warranty.'6
5. Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Boyle, 231 App. Div. 101, 246 N.Y. Supp.
142 (4th Dep't 1930); Thomson Spot Welder Co. v. Dickelman Manufacturing Co.,
15 Ohio App. 270 (1921); Hartford Battery Sales Corp. v. Price, 119 Pa. Super. 165,
181 Ati. 95 (1935); Hinton v. Wagner, 10 Tenn. App. 173 (E.S. 1928); Milwaukee
Tank Works v. Metals Coating Co., 196 Wis. 191, 218 N.W. 835 (1928).
6. See note 2 supra.
7. E.g., New Georgia Nat. Bank v. Lippman, 249 N.Y. 307, 164 N.E. 108, 60
A.L.R. 1344 (1928). For a complete discussion of these three groups and the general
topic of the nature of implied warranties and their use in regard to sales transactions,
see Note, 2 VAND. L. Rr'v. 675 (1949).
8. Smith, Surviving Fictions, 27 YALE L.J. 147, 317 (1918); Williston, Liability for
Honest Misrepresentation,24 HARv. L. REV. 415 (1911).
9. PROSSER, TORTS § 82 (1941) ; 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 195 (Rev. ed. 1948) ; Ames,
The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. Rv. 1 (1888).
10. Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778). This is the first
reported case, although it is indicated that this practice had been followed for some
time prior to this case.
11. That these promissory warranties are contractual, see VOLD, SALES § 141 (1931).
12. E.g., Rainey v. New York & P.S.S. Co., 216 Fed. 449 (9th Cir. 1914), cert,
denied sub non. Rainey v. W.R. Grace & Co., 235 U.S. 704 (1914) ; 56 C.J., Seamen §
115 (1932).
13. "[B]reach of the 'obligation' to furnish a seaworthy ship is a tort ...

"

185

F.2d at 588 (2d Cir. 1950). See also Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66
Sup. Ct. 872, 90 L. Ed. 1099 (1946).
14. 137 L.T. 57, 43 T.L.R. 260 (K.B. 1927).
15. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 Sup. Ct. 872, 90 L. Ed.
1099 (1946). For the public policy argument involved in cases of serving food, see
VOLD, SALES

§ 153 (1931).
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These two cases, supporting the proposition that warranties are not
restricted to contractual transactions, might well serve as the basis for a general broadening of the applicability of the policy favoring the recognition of
warranties.

NEGLIGENCE OF LANDOWNER-PERSON TAKING SHORTCUT
THROUGH STORE-LICENSEE OR BUSINESS GUEST?
Plaintiff brought an action for personal injuries sustained in a fall
through the entrance to defendant's drug store. On the outside of the door
were the name of the store and two warnings to "watch your step." This door
opened inward directly over two steps with no intervening platform. There
was evidence that the door was a heavy metal one, that the marble steps
had become worn and slick, and that there was no handrail. The drug store
was customarily used as a passageway between a garage parking lot and the
elevator lobby of the building in which the drug store was located. Plaintiff,
who was on his way to visit his doctor, a tenant in the building, had no
intention of making a purchase in the drug store and entered it only because
it was a convenient shortcut to the lobby. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Held, affirmed. There was evidence to support the trial
court's implied finding that plaintiff was an implied invitee of defendant on
the premises where the injury occurred and that defendant knew, or in
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the unsafe condition. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 235 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1950).
The duty owed by a landowner to a licensee is to use reasonable care
to warn him of known dangerous conditions not apparent to him.' The
duty owed to a business visitor is to use due care to discover dangerous
conditions and to repair them or warn of them. 2 Instead of "business visitor," the courts usually employ the misleading term "invitee," which may
3
apply both to a customer and to a social guest.
The traditional test for determining whether the visitor should be
characterized as a business visitor or as a licensee has been the pecuniary
or economic benefit which the occupant derives or expects to derive from the
presence of the visitor.4 Some courts insist on a strict interpretation of the
1. PaossER, ToRTs § 78 (1941).
2. PRossER, ToRTs § 79 (1941).
3. The customer is entitled to protection; the social guest is not. See Prosser,
Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MiNN. L. RExv. 573 (1942).
4. For discussion of the distinction in early cases, see Bennett v. Railroad Co., 102
U.S. 577, 26 L. Ed. 235 (1881) and Sweeny v. Old Colony & N.R.R., 92 Mass. (10
Allen) 368, 87 Am. Dec. 644 (1865).
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test; most courts at least pay it lip service. 5 Using the economic-benefit technique, at least two courts have held, in circumstances similar to the situation
in the principal case, that the plaintiff was a licensee. 6 But even where the
plaintiff has been held to be a licensee, he has been allowed to recover where
the defendant has changed the condition of premises customarily used by the
public, without giving any warning of the change.7
The business-visitor test cannot be expressed solely in terms of an
invitation to come in; no express invitation is needed when the public
assumes the safety of the premises from habitual and unopposed usage.8
An implied invitation may arise from the character of the premises, which
the landowner has established. A driveway which was the only means of
access to an apartment (visitor of tenant injured), 9 a path across owner's
property between rented garage and renter's home, 10 an areaway between
two buildings utilized for ingress and egress," an areaway common to
several stores 1 2 and a footbridge built and maintained by a railroad'8 have
been held to be used by implied invitation. Misrepresentation by the de5. A business visitor is defined in RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 332 (1934). When the
plaintiff is a customer, actual or potential, the courts almost unanimously denominate
him a business visitor. Touchy v. Owl Drug Co., 6 Cal. App2d 64, 44 P.2d 405 (1935).
Contra: Kneiser v. Belasco-Blackwood Co., 22 Cal. App. 205, 133 Pac. 989 (1913),
criticized in Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal.2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944). For collections
of cases in which a customer was held to be a business visitor, see Notes, 162 A.L.R.
949 (1946), 100 A.L.R. 710 (1936), 58 A.L.R. 136 (1929), 46 A.L.R. 1111 (1927),
43 A.L.R. 866 (1926), 33 A.L.R. 181 (1924).
6. Brosnan v. Koufman, 294 Mass. 495, 2 N.E.2d 441, 104 A.L.R. 1177 (1936)
(license given by law to mail letter in lobby which was also a shortcut); Baird v.
Goldberg, 283 Ky. 558, 142 S.W.2d 120 (1940) (convenience and public use of a
shortcut through a store's vestibule did not imply an invitation).
7. Gulf Refining Co. v. Beane, 133 Tex. 157, 127 S.W.2d 169 (1937) (held to be
an exception to the usual rule applied to licensees). Cf. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v.
Newton, 131 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1942) in which the court said that even if plaintiff
were merely a licensee, "it is a mistake to suppose that the possessor of land owes
no duty to a visitor except to abstain from wilful and wanton injury, when once it is
determined that he is a mere licensee. The law . . is not so simple or so unjust." Id.
at 848.
8. Children accompanying their parents are invitees. See, e.g., Weinberg v. Hartman, 65 A.2d 805 (Del. Super. Ct. 1949) (citing cases) ; Grogan v. O'Keefe's, Inc.,
267 Mass. 189, 166 N.E. 721 (1929); Carlisle v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 137 Tex. 220,
152 S.W.2d 1073 (1941). Contra: Fleckenstein v. Great A. & P. Co., 91 N.J.L. 145,
102 Atl. 700, L.R.A. 1918C 179 (1917), criticized in Weinberg v. Hartman, supra.
See also cases collected in A.L.R. Notes, note 5 supra. Taylor v. McCowat-Mercer
Printing Co., 27 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Tenn. 1939) holds that a person delivering food
to defendant's servants is an express invitee and the court said, in discussing two
previous cases where under the same facts plaintiff was denied recovery as a licensee,
"The harsh, inhumanitarian, unsound reasoning of these cases is expressly disapproved."
Id. at 884.
9. Wool v. Lamer, 112 Vt. 431, 26 A.2d 89 (1942).
10. Olderman v. Bridgeport-City Trust Co., 125 Conn. 177, 4 A.2d 646 (1939).
11. Ferdinando v. Rosenthal, 169 Misc. 953, 8 N.Y.S.2d 399 (N.Y. Munic. Ct.
1938), quoting Danna v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry., 252 App. Div. 776, 300
N.Y. Supp. 437 (2d Dep't 1937) that an affirmative duty exists where an owner permits
part of his premises to be used as a public passageway.
12. Yamauchi v. O'Neill, 38 Cal. App.2d 703, 102 P.2d 365 (1940). The negligence
in this case was "active", but there was dictum to the effect that plaintiff was an invitee,
although not a customer at the time.
13. Missouri P.R.R. v. English, 187 Ark. 557, 61 S.W.2d 445 (1933).
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fendant or mistake of the plaintiff, even though held to obviate a finding of
a fictitious invitation, was the basis of liability where a private road appeared
to be part of the highway. 14 But where the plaintiff was injured when he
entered the wrong door into an untenanted and dilapidated office, the court
held that he had been invited to enter and that, as a matter of law, the defendant should have anticipated the possibility of use of the premises by one
not knowing the danger.'5 Plaintiff's who have come into a store for such
purposes as to use the telephone' 6 or the toilet,' 7 without any intention of
buying, have been called "invitees" by the courts and have been allowed
8
recovery.'
Dean Prosser believes that a duty to use care is imposed upon a landowner because of his implied representation to the public that reasonable
care has been exercised to make the premises safe, rather than that the liability arises from a present or prospective financial benefit,' 9 and that the
early cases based liability on the fact that the "plaintiff entered as one of the
public, in response to a public invitation, upon a place held out to the
public as safe ... "20
Landowners have traditionally been excepted from liability for actions
which would come within the usual definition of negligence as conduct which
falls below that necessary for the protection of others against unreasonable
harm. The principal case and the background of decisions noted suggest that
there is a trend toward holding the possessor of land to the conventional
standard of care when he has opened his property to the public.21 Language
of the courts that an invitation is implied simply befogs the issue.
14. Southern v. Cowan Stone Co., 188 Tenn. 576, 221 S.W.2d 809 (1949), 21
201 (1950).
15. Kallum v. Wheeler, 129 Tex. 74, 101 S.W.2d 225 (1937) ; for a discussion of
this case, see Note, 22 TEx. L. REv. 489, 493 et seq. (1944). Other cases dealing with the
duty of defendant to anticipate visitors on his premises include Colgrove v. Lompoc
Model T Club, 51 Cal. App.2d 18, 124 P.2d 128 (1942); Malolepszy v. Central Market,
143 Neb. 356, 9 N.W.2d 474 (1943); Bohn Bros. v. Turner, 182 S.W.2d 419 (Tex.
1944).
16. Ward v. Avery, 113 Conn. .394, 155 Atl. 502 (1931). Contra: McMullen v.
M. & M. Hotel Co., 227 Iowa 1061, 290 N.W. 3 (1940) ; overruled, Sulhoff v. Everett,
235 Iowa 396, 16 N.W.2d 737 (1944).
17. Haley v. Deer, 135 Neb. 459, 282 N.W. 389 (1938).
18. The question usually posed is whether plaintiff became a licensee when he
strayed from the area to which invited. See Sulhoff v. Everett, 235 Iowa 396, 16
N.W.2d 737 (1944); Glaser v. Rothschild, 221 Mo. 180, 120 S.W. 1 (1909); American
Nat. Bank v. Wolfe, 22 Tenn. App. 642, 125 S.W.2d 193 (M.S. 1938) and cases collected in A.L.R. Notes, note 5 supra. Contra: Willins v. Ludwig, 136 N.J.L. 208,
55 A.2d 48 (1947), 21 TEMP. L.Q. 440 (1948).
19. PRosssR, TORTS 637-40 (1941).
20. Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MiN. L. Ray. 573, 580 (1942).
21. In the principal case, the court quotes from Carlisle v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,
137 Tex. 220, 152 S.W.2d 1073 (1941), stating that "It would not be a very humanitarian doctrine to say that a merchant could thus impliedly invite the public to his
store, but that he was under the duty of exercising ordinary care for the safety only
TENN. L. REV.

of those who had an intention of buying his merchandise. . .

."

235 S.W.2d at 616.

In view of this dictum, it is possible that the court would have allowed recovery even
if it had called plaintiff a licensee.
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RES JUDICATA-INDEMNITOR-INDEMNITEE RELATIONSHIP AS
EXCEPTION TO REQUREMENT OF MUTUALITY-CREATION
OF RELATIONSHIP BY CONTRACT
Plaintiff brought an action against the defendant to recover for injuries
sustained in a collision between a truck driven by plaintiff and a train
operated by lessee of defendant. The lease contract made the lessee the
indemnitor of defendant as to damages of the nature sought in this action.
Defendant impleaded the lessee as a third party defendant, and then pleaded
res judicata and estoppel by judgment as to the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence. This issue had been decided adversely to plaintiff in a
prior action, arising out of the same transaction, brought in a federal court
against lessee alone.I The particular act of negligence now alleged by
plaintiff was not submitted to the jury in the first action, but a judgment was
ordered for defendant on the sole ground of plaintiff's contributory negligence
as a matter of law. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appealed. Held, affirmed. Judgment against plaintiff in a prior action brought
against one who is now a third party defendant and who is an indemnitorlessee is res judicata and may be invoked by an indemnitee-lessor. Hawley
v. Davenport, R.I. & N.W. Ry., 45 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1951).
Stated broadly, the doctrine of res judicata is that a valid and final
judgment rendered upon the merits is conclusive as to the parties and their
privies in respect to rights and facts which later may be in issue in any
judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction if the cause of action is the same;
it is conclusive as to issues actually litigated and determined if the cause of
action is different.2 In general, the reasons given for the existence of the
doctrine fall into two groups: (1) that public policy favors an end to
litigation and the stability of judicial determinations, and (2) that the
defendant should not be unduly harrassed and put in danger of paying
twice. 3 The effect of absorbing a cause of action into a judgment for the
plaintiff or of destroying it by a judgment for the defendant is described
by the terms merger, bar and estoppel by judgment, 4 and courts and text1. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Ruan Transp. Corp., 171 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1948).
2. See, e.g., Hummel v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 151 F.2d 994, 996 (1945);
Hedlund v. Miner, 395 Ill. 217, 69 N.E.2d 862 (1946); Burlew v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,
276 Ky. 132, 122 S.W.2d 990 (1938) ; Wright v. Schick, 134 Ohio St. 193, 16 N.E.2d
321 (1938). See Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942).
3. See, e.g., Guettel v. United States, 95 F.2d 229 (8th Cir. 1938); New York
State Labor Relations Board v. Holland Laundry, 294 N.Y. 480, 63 N.E.2d 68 (1945) ;
Permian Oil Co. V. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 73 S.W.2d 490 (1934); 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS
§ 500 (1891) ; Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942);
Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299 (1929). See Cleary, Res Judicata
Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948), for a criticism of the reasons for res judicata.
4. The leading case distinguishing bar and estoppel is Cromwell v. County of Sac,
94 1J.S. 351, 353, 24 L. Ed. 195 (1876). See BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL 9 (6th ed., Carter,
1913).; 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS §§ 500, 504, 506 (1891); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by
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writers often speak of res judicata in these terms, which only express the
result of the doctrine. 5 The effect of conclusively determining an issue of
fact is called collateral estoppel or estoppel by verdict,6 and, in special cases,.
direct estoppel. 7 Merger, bar and estoppel by judgment apply only to the
same cause of action, while on the other hand, collateral estoppel and estoppel
by verdict apply to different causes of action.8
Res judicata generally affects only the parties to a cause of action and
their privies. 9 A privy to a party is one who claims through that party. 10
For the purpose of applying the doctrine of res judicata the term "parties"
.is broadly defined to include all who are directly interested in the subject
matter and those who are parties upon the record.-" Under the doctrine of
mutuality, however, a person within the class of party or privy generally
may not invoke the benefits of res judicata unless an adverse decision would
have been binding upon him.' 2 This doctrine, therefore, generally prevents
the application of res judicata in any situation in which separate plaintiffs
acquire rights against a single defendant as a result of a single transaction,
whether the judgment is for the plaintiff or the defendant.' 3 Further, if a
single plaintiff acquires rights against separate defendants as a result of a
single transaction, a judgment for the plaintiff or defendant normally will
not be res judicata in an action against another defendant unless an exception is made to the doctrine of mutuality. 14 Such an exception is generally
made where the relationship of the defendants is that of master-servant,
principal-agent or indemnitor-indemnitee, and where the first action is against
ludgment, 56* HAv. L. REV. 1 (1942) ; Note, 88 A.L.R. 574, 576 (1934) ; 2 VAND. L.
REv. 135 (1948). RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS 160 (1942), uses the term "res judicata" to
include merger, bar, collateral estoppel and direct estoppel.
5. Pirsig, Merger by Judgment, 28

MINN.

L.

REV.

419 (1944); Scott, Collateral

Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HA v. L. REv. 1 (1942).
6. Note 4 supra. See also RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942). This is the
aspect of res judicata considered in the present case.
7. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 45(d).

8. See notes 4, 5, 6 supra.
9. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Min. & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111,
32 Sup. Ct. 641, 56 L. Ed. 1009 (1912).
10. Womack v. St. Joseph, 201 Mo. 467, 100 S.W. 443 (1907); BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL
158 (6th ed., Carter, 1913) ; 2 BLAcK, JUDGMENTS § 549 (1891). For relationships not
justifying the invocation of res judicata, see, e.g., Myers' Adm'r v. Brown, 250 Ky.
64, 61 S.W.2d 1052 (1933) ; McAlevey v. Litch, 234 Mass. 440, 125 N.E. 606 (1920);

Scott v. Hartog, 75 Misc. 126, 132 N.Y. Supp. 846 (1912).
11. 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 430 (5th ed., Tuttle, 1925).
12. 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS § 548 (1891); 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 428 (5th ed.,
Tuttle, 1925); Notes, 133 A.L.R. 181 (1941), 91 U. OF PA. L. REv. 467 (1943), 35
YALE L.J. 607 (1926).
13. E.g., Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Marsh, 195 Ark. 1135, 115 S.W.2d 825
(1938); Johnson v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 197 Iowa 594, 195 N.W. 1002 (1923);
McGreevey v. Boston Elevated Ry., 232 Mass. 347, 122 N.E. 278 (1919); Meacham
v. Larus & Bros. Co., 212 N.C. 646, 194 S.E. 99 (1937); Johnston v. Kincheloe, 164

Va. 370, 180 S.E. 540 (1935).
14. Sturman v. New York Cent. R.R., 280 N.Y. 57, 19 N.E.2d 679 (1939);
Maryland Cas. Co. y. Morris, 128 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
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the party primarily liable and the judgment is for the defendant. 15 Thus,
res judicata is applied in these exceptional cases.
The relationship of lessor and lessee in the instant case was not regarded by the court as sufficient to bring the two railroads within this exceptional group.16 The only basis, therefore, on which the defendants in
this case could be classified within this exception is by reason of the contractual obligation of the lessee to indemnify the lessor. Such a contractual
obligation makes the lessee liable by reason of contract in addition to the
liability for its own breach of duty. The court in the instant case holds that
where this situation is presented the parties fall within the exceptional
group, and that the issue of the plaintiff's contributory negligence determined
adversely to the plaintiff in the first action was res judicata in the present
action, since the first action was against the party under a contractual obligation to indemnify. The effect of the indemnity obligation in the contract
is that the defendants were able to diminish the rights of the plaintiff by a
contract to which he was neither a party nor a beneficiary and of which he
may have been entirely ignorant. Had the obligation of indemnity not existed, the plaintiff could have sued each party separately as primarily
responsible, without hindrance by the doctrine of res judicata. On the
other hand, with or without the contract, the defendants would not have
been hampered by a prior adjudication. If this same logic were followed
to an extreme, joint tortfeasors could escape liability by signing a contract
of indemnity after a wrong had been committed.
In the case of tortfeasors responsible for the same act, where one is
entitled by operation of law to indemnity from the other, the rule that a
judgment for the indemnitor against an injured-party plaintiff will terminate the latter's cause of action against the indemnitee, is based upon the
circumstance that a favorable judgment for the plaintiff in the second action
would necessarily be unfair to either the indemnitor or the indemnitee.
Either the indemnitee is deprived of his right of indemnity or the indemnitor
is forced to pay for a claim despite the prior judgment holding the claim
invalid. 17 The court in the instant case treats the same viewpoint as ap15. Fightmaster v. Tauber, 43 Ohio App. '266, 183 N.E. 116 (1932); Rookard
v. Atlanta & C. Air Line Ry., 84 S.C. 190, 65 S.E. 1047 (1909); Note, 31 A.L.R.
194 (1924); 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS § 573 (1891); 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §§ 451-52
(5th ed., Tuttle, 1925). For cases involving the lessor-lessee relationship, see Anderson
v. West Chicago St. R.R., 200 Ill. 329, 65 N.E. 717 (1902); Muntz v. Algiers & G.
St. Ry., 116 La. 236, 40 So. 688 (1906). Contra: Logan v. Atlanta & C.A.L.R.R., 82
S.C. 518, 64 S.E. 515 (1909).
16. 45 N.W.2d at 515. Reliance was placed on Iowa statutes, and the conclusion
was reached that as far as the third party was concerned, the responsibility of both
'lessor and lessee was "primary, joint and several." This primary liability to third
parties, however, does not necessarily mean, as the court seems to have assumed, that
no legal obligation for indemnity was raised between the parties themselves. Cf., e.g.,
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 95 (1937).

17.

See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS

§ 96,

comment a

(1942).
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plicable when the obligation to indemnify is created by contract. But the
obligation placed upon an indemnitor because of his primary responsibility
for a tort injury is imposed by law, and is quite different from a contractual
obligation which is voluntarily assumed and is defined by the terms of
the agreement. The argument that a denial of the benefits of res judicata
would be unfair either to the indemnitor or indemnitee does not apply if
the liability is contractual, for if the indemnitor should be required to pay
he has done nothing more than carry out his voluntary obligation, and if
the indemnitee loses his right to indemnity it will be only because the indemnitor was not liable under the terms of the contract.

TAXATION-STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-EXEMPTION OF
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION ENGAGED IN COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITY
The Gem State Academy, an educational institution maintained by the
Idaho Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, a religious corporation, operated a bakery for the vocational training of students. It employed a
manager and seven truck drivers, who sold to the public at retail a substantial part of the bakery products. All profits above expenses of the bakery
were absorbed by the church conference, no part inuring to the benefit of any
private individual. The State Industrial Accident Board affirmed a determination by the Employment Security Agency that the bakery was liable
under the state employment security law for taxes on remuneration of the
truck drivers and the manager. Held (4-1), affirmed as to the truck drivers,
but modified to include only one-half the manager's salary.' It is the nature
of the activity which controls, not the character of the organization; and an
employer may be engaged in both exempt and nonexempt activities at the
same time. In re Gem State Academy Bakery, 224 P.2d 529 (Idaho 1950).
The ground for tax exemptions granted religious, charitable and educational institutions 2 is that the grantee performs a service which benefits
the public. 3 While tax exemption provisions are traditionally construed
1. Upon first hearing, the Board's decision was reversed in a 3-2 decision, based

on consideration of uniformity of construction and the policy of liberal construction

in favor of exemption of such nonprofit institutions. On rehearing, after one judge
resigned, the dissenting opinion was adopted by the majority (4-1), one judge of the
former majority changing his position.
2. The question has been raised whether the exemption from taxes of religious
institutions is prohibited by the First Amendment to United States Constitution, and
similar provisions of constitutions of the states. For an excellent treatment of this subject see Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation,
14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 144 (1949).

3. See, e.g., Stamford Jewish Center v. Town of Stamford, 117 Conn. 379, 168
Atl. 5, 7 (1933); 2 COOLEY, TAXATION § 738 (4th ed., Nichols, 1924); 51 Am. JUR.,
Taxation §§ 600, 613, 625 (1944) ; Baker, Tax Exemption Statutes, 7 TEx. L. REv. 50,
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strictly against the exemption, 4 the courts have been more liberal in construing clauses exempting these nonprofit organizations. Courts have been
7
less stringent in interpreting exemption provisions of transfer( and income
taxes than those of general property taxes.8
The exemption provision of the Federal Unemployment Compensation
Act,9 the model for most state exemption clauses, was copied by Congress
from the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Although
Congress indicated an intent that the federal provision was to be applied in
the same manner as that of the income tax law, making the use of income
the controlling consideration,' 0 there is no mandate directly binding state
courts in construing state laws.'1
60 (1928). For a general survey of problems which arise in this field, see Baker, Some
Questions Raised it the Field of Tax Exemption, 8 TEx. L. REv. 196 (1930).
4. 2 CooLEY, TAXATION § 672 (4th ed., Nichols, 1924); 51 Am. JuR., Taxation
§ 524 (1944); Baker, Judicial Interpretation Qf Tax Exemption Statutes, 7 TEx. L.

REv. 385 (1929).
5. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden De Predicatores, 263 U.S. 578, 44 Sup. Ct. 204,
68 L. Ed. 458 (1924) ; Commissioner v. Orton, 173 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1949) ; Roche's
Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938); Union & New Haven Trust
v. Eaton, 20 F.2d 419 (D. Conn. 1927) ; Scripps Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. California
Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal.2d 669, 151 P.2d 109, 155 A.L.R. 360 (1944); Board of
Assessors v. Lamson, 316 Mass. 166, 55 N.E.2d 215, 154 A.L.R. 886 (1944) ; Ancient
& A.S.R. of Freemasonry v. Lancaster County, 122 Neb. 586, 241 N.W. 93, 81 A.L.R.
1166 (1932); Baker, Judicial Interpretation of Tax Exemption Statutes, 7 TEX. L.
Rv. 385 (1929).
6. See, e.g., Union & New Haven Trust v. Eaton, 20 F.2d 419, 421 (D. Conn.
1927) ; In re Clark's Estate, 131 Me. 105, 159 Atl. 500, 501 (1932) ; In re Mergantime's

Estate, 129 App. Div. 367, 113 N.Y. Supp. 948, 953 (1st Dep't 1908), aff'd, 195 N.Y.
572, 88 N.E. 1125 (1909).
7. See Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 150-51, 55 Sup. Ct. 17, 79 L. Ed. 246
(1934) ; Cochran v, Commissioner, 78 F.2d 176, 178 (4th Cir. 1935); 6 MERTENS,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION § 34.02 (Rev. ed., Henderson, 1949).

8. See, e.g., Bistline v. Bassett, 47 Idaho 66, 272 Pac. 696, 697, 62 A.L.R. 323
(1928) ; Boston Symphony Orchestra v. Board of Assessors, 294 Mass. 248, 1 N.E.2d

6, 10 (1936); Detroit v. Detroit Commercial College, 322 Mich. 142, 33 N.W.2d 737,

739-40 (1948) ; Carteret Academy v. State Board of Taxes and Assessment, 102 N.J.L.
525, 133 Atl. 886, 887 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Lawrence-Smith School v. City of New York,
166 Misc. 856, 2 N.Y.S.2d 752, 755 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aft'd, 280 N.Y. 805, 21 N.E.2d
693 (1939).
9. INT. REV. CODE § 1607(c) (8). The act excludes from the definition of employment, "(8) Service performed in the employ of a corporation, community chest,
fund or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, and no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation. . . ." The language of
the exemption clause of the Idaho law is almost identical. IDAHO CODE § 72 -1316(a) (7)
(1949). See also id. § 72-1302, which declares public policy of the state in passing its
Employment Security Law.
10. "For the purpose of determining whether services for such an organization
[under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1011(b)(8) (1940)] are excluded,
the use to which the income is applied is the ultimate test of the exclusion rather
than the source from which the income is derived. For instance, if a church owns an
apartment building from which it derives income which is devoted to religious, charitable, educational, or scientific purposes, services for it are still excluded." H.R. REP.
No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1935). For two interesting cases in which state courts
declined to adopt this test, see Murphy v. Concordia Publishing House, 348 Mo. 753,
155 S.W.2d 122, 136 A.L.R. 1461 (1941) (church-owned publishing house held not
exempt); Mohawk Mills Association v. Miller, 260 App. Div. 433, 22 N.Y.S.2d 993
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In unemployment tax cases involving commercial activities of religious,
charitable and educational institutions, a substantial number of courts have
adopted the same rule of liberal construction which had been developed
chiefly in the income tax cases.12 Such decisions have stressed the desirability of uniformity with federal decisions and have inferred from the exact
duplication of the language of the income tax provisions a tacit approval
of a parallel construction.13 It is reasoned that an organization possessing
an overall characteristic which brings it within the exempted class is not
disqualified because of a commercial activity which is merely incidental to
14
its main purpose, the profits from which are used for exempt purposes.
A few courts have taken the position that if an organization, though
generally within the exempt class, engages in any substantial activity of
a commercial nature, which in no way contributes to the exempted purposes,
it loses its immunity.' 5 The instant case, by analogy to the test of property
tax construction-that it is the use made of the property which is determina(3d Dep't 1940) (employees association held not organized exclusively for exempt
purposes).
It is significant that Congress in the Revenue Act of 1950 has curtailed the income tax privileges of educational, charitable and other organizations, except churches,
by taxing the "unrelated" income of such organizations. The Act also makes a "feeder"
company, one which pays its entire income over to an organization which is exempt
under § 101, subject to income tax. INT. REv. CODE §§ 101(6), 421-22. These provisions
seem to raise serious doubt as to the continuing validity of the "use" test of exemption.
11. See, e.g., Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tone, 125 Conn. 183, 4 A.2d
640, 642-43, 121 A.L.R. 993 (1939) ; Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co., 215 -N.C. 491, 2 S.E.2d 592, 597 (1939) ; 48 AM. Jua., Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, and Retirement Funds §§ 7, 15 (1943); 11 GEo.
WAs H. L. REv. 125 (1942).

12. See, e.g., Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144, 150-51, 55 Sup. Ct. 17, 79 L. Ed.
246 (1934); Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden De Predicatores, 263 U.S. 578, 581, 44 Sup.
Ct. 204, 68 L. Ed. 458 (1924); Commissioner v. Orton, 173 F.2d 483, 486 (6th Cir.
1949) ; Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1938) ; Cochran
v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 176, 179 (4th Cir. 1935). But see note 10, supra.
13. See Hassett v. Associated Hospital Service, 125 F.2d 611, 616 (1st Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 672 (1942), 55 HARv. L. Ray. 1055; Oklahoma State Fair and
Exposition v. Jones, 44 F. Supp. 630, 631-32 (W.D. Okla. 1942); Scripps Memorial
Hospital v. California Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal.2d 669, 151 P.2d 109, 114, 155
A.L.R. 360 (1944); Sioux Falls Post, American Legion v. Williamson, 41 N.W.2d 647,
649 (S.D. 1950); Virginia Mason Hospital Ass'n v. Larson, 9 Wash.2d 284, 114 P.2d
976, 981 (1941). But see note 10, supra.
14. The leading income tax case on which most of the decisions rely is Trinidad
v. Sagrada Orden De Predicatores, 263 U.S. 578, 44 Sup. Ct. 204, 68 L. Ed. 458 (1924).
There the Court said in construing the excepting clause, "Two matters apparent on the
face of the clause go far toward settling the meaning. First, it recognizes that a corporation may be organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
or educational purposes, and yet have a net income. Next, it says nothing about the
source of the income, but makes the destination the ultimate test of the exemption."
Id. at 581. It added: "That the transaction yielded some profit is, in the circumstances,.
a negligence matter." Id. at 582. But the Court added, "It is not claimed that there
is any selling to the public or in competition with others."
15. American Medical Ass'n v. Board of Review, 392 Ill. 614, 65 N.E.2d 350
(1946); Smith v. Brooklyn Bar Ass'n, 266 App. Div. 1038, 44 N.Y.S.2d 620 (3d
Dep't 1943), aff'd, 292 N.Y. 593, 55 N.E.2d 368 (1944).
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tive, not destination of income'Q--holds that the nature of the activity, and
not the destination of the income therefrom, controls the liability for unem7
ployment compensation taxes.'
The basic public policy underlying the unemployment compensation
laws is to afford temporary relief from economic distress arising out of
unemployment.' 8 In view of such a purpose, the reasons for liberal construction in favor of exemptions for religious, charitable and educational
institutions under other laws are of doubtful application here. Such exemptions give the exempt organizations an unfair advantage over competing
businesses, privately owned, which are subject to the tax.10 Whereas the
burden of income tax exemptions falls on all members of the taxpaying
public in the form of higher taxes, the entire burden of unemployment tax
exemptions falls on the relatively small group of excluded employees.
Numerous authorities have questioned the wisdom of excluding such em20
ployees from coverage at all.
In the principal case, the rule applied by the court seems a sensible
compromise between the two conflicting policies. Employees performing
services within the exempted fields are excluded; employees engaged in
activities of a commercial nature are covered, though carried on by an
organization otherwise exempt, and regardless of the use made of the income. The decision is in accordance with the present congressional policy
on income tax exemptions. Provisions of the Revenue Act of 195021 make
"unrelated" income of many otherwise. exempt organizations subject to
income tax and abolish the exemption of "feeder" organizations.

UNFAIR COMPETITION-TRADE NAME INFRINGEMENTREQUISITES FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Defendant was engaged in developing color film under the name of Life
Color Laboratory, Inc. In its advertisement, the name, "Life Color Labs,"
was featured in black and white, the word "Life" being no more prominent
than the other words. Plaintiff, publisher of Life Magazine had a registered
16. See, e.g., Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. Hoehn, 355 Mo. 257, 196 S.W.2d 134,
143 (1946); Battelle Memorial Institute v. Dunn, 148 Ohio St. 53, 73 N.E.2d 88, 92

(1947) ; Gibson v. Phillips University, 195 Okla. 456, 158 P.2d 901, 902 (1945).
17. 224 P.2d at 540.
18. H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935).

19. See 224 P.2d at 531. The bakery in question had a volume of sales in excess
of $4,000 monthly, a substantial business in a small town.
20. See Gellhorn, The Extension of Coverage- of Unemployment Compensation.
23 MINN. L. REv. 173, 174 (1938); Gray, Unemployment Insurance in the State of

New York, 13 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 19, 22 (1935); Paulsen, Preferment of Religious
Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 LAw & CoNTEM.P. PRoD. 144 (1949);
49 CoL. L. REv. 411, 413 (1949).
21. 64 STAT. 947, 950, 953, 959, 26 U.S.C.A. &§101 (6), 421-22 (Supp. 1950).
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trade name, "Life," which appeared on its publication in white letters
against a red background. Plaintiff operated a laboratory for research in
the field of color photography, but otherwise there was no competition between the parties. There was no evidence to show injury to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff sued to enjoin the use of the word "Life" and to obtain damages.
Held, injunction granted, but the suit as to damages dismissed. A plaintiff
is entitled to protection in the use of his trade name even as against noncompeting goods. Time, Inc. v. Life Color Laboratory,Inc., 101 N.Y. S.2d
586 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
Descriptive,' generic2 and geographical 3 words generally may not be the
subject of a trade name unless they have been used for a period of time
sufficient to cause an association between the word and the product in the mind
of the public, thus acquiring a secondary meaning. Only those words which
are fanciful and arbitrary are susceptible of exclusive appropriation. 4 The
primary value of the modern trade name lies in its selling power. It is a
medium through which sales are induced by a process of association of product and trade name.5 With the increase of goods and services in modern
day economy, it is inevitable that one producer will infringe upon the trade
name of another.
Formerly, courts of equity refused injunctive relief for a trade name
infringement unless there was a showing of actual competition between a
plaintiff and defendant.6 The gist of the action was a "palming off" of the
defendant's goods as those of the plaintiff,7 and under the proposition that
injunctive relief depends on a showing of actual or potential injury, the
courts reasoned that if there were no actual competition, there could be no
diversion of trade from the plaintiff to the defendant and thus no injury.
Under this view, relief has been denied even where the defendant knowingly
1. See Bolander v. Peterson, 136 Ill. 215, 26 N.E. 603, 11 L.R.A. 350 (1891);

52 Am. Jut., Trademarks, Trade Names and Trade Practices § 57 n.11 (1944).
2. See American Automobile Ass'n v. American Automobile Owners' Ass'n, 216
Cal. 125, 13 P.2d 707, 83 A.L.R. 699 (1932); REsTATEmENT, TORTS § 721 (1938).
3. See Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 21 Sup.
Ct. 270, 45 L. Ed. 365 (1901).
4. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 36 Sup. Ct.
269, 60 L. Ed. 629 (1916); Kyle v. Perfection Mattress Co., 127 Ala. 39, 28 So. 545,
50 L.R.A. 628 (1900); Schmidt v. Brieg, 100 Cal. 672, 35 Pac. 623, 22 L.R.A. 790
(1893); 52 Am. Ju., Trademarks, Trade Names and Trade Practices § 56 (1944).
5. Note, 25 VA. L. REv. 454 (1939).
6. See, e.g., Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510
(7th Cir. 1912); Note, 148 A.L.R. 12 (1944). A few modem courts have expressed
the same view. See, e.g., Esskay Art Galleries v. Gibbs, 205 Ark. 1157, 172 S.W.2d
924 (1943); Women's Mut. Benefit Soc'y v. Catholic Soc'y, 304 Mass. 349, 23 N.E.2d
886 (1939).
7. See Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 21 Sup.
Ct. 270, 45 .L. Ed. 365 (1901); Goodyear's India Rubber Gloge Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598, 9 Sup. Ct. 166, 32 L. Ed. 535 (1888); Newport Sand
Bank Co. v. Monarch Sand Mining Co., 144 Ky. 7, 137 S.W. 784 (1911); 1 NIms,
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADz-MARxS 52 (4th ed. 1947).
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appropriated the plaintiff's trade name, since there was no diversion of
trade.8
The modern action of unfair competition may be based on misappropriation and is not confined to "palming off." Actual competition as to goods and
services is unnecessary. 9 The theory is that one who markets his goods
under a particular trade name vouches for their quality. If another borrows
that trade name, the reputation of the first user is at stake. This is true even
though the goods or services are dissimilar, as long as there is a likelihood
that purchasers will be led to believe that the products of plaintiff and defendant come from a single source or from related sources. In such a
situation the plaintiff's reputation and good will would be subjected to
risks not within his own control, and equity will enjoin the creation of
these risks. In the modern cases, the courts concern themselves with two
primary questions: (1) did the defendant, in offering his product for sale,
represent the product to be that of the plaintiff, and (2) if so, is this
representation likely to deceive the average purchaser?1o Although these
questions are couched in terms of representation, it is not to be confused with
"palming off." The primary consideration is whether the defendant marketed
his goods under a trade name similar to that of the plaintiff in such manner
that the public would probably believe that the products originated at a
common source. But if the defendant had this probability in mind when he
misappropriated the plaintiff's trade name, there is an even stronger case for
the plaintiff."
Protection of a trade name is said to be limited to those markets where
the name is known to the public and where sales of the product occurs.12
Thus an injunction has been denied when the second user of a particular
name had innocently built up a good market not already exploited by the
first user.'8 However, there is language in at least one case which indicates
that a plaintiff might be entitled to an injunction, if his trade name is
8. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510 (7th
Cir. 1912).

9. Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948); Hanson v.
Triangle Publications, 163 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 855 (1948);
Standard Brands v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928); Notes, 7 RocKY MT. L. REv. 277 (1935), 32 VA.
L. REv. 637 (1946) ; 28 NEB. L. Ryv. 126 (1948).
10. Note, 25 VA. L. Rnv. 454 (1939).
11. See Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Aetna Auto Finance, 123 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 824 (1942).
12. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 39 Sup. Ct. 48,
63 L. Ed. 141 (1918); General Baking Co. v. Goldblatt Bros., 90 F.2d 241 (7th Cir.
1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 732 (1937).
13. Emerson Electric Mfg. Co. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 105 F.2d
908 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 616 (1939).
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familiar in the defendant's territory, even though the plaintiff has not made
sales there. 14
In the instant case the court, although reluctantly, followed the modern
trend and granted an injunction even in the absence of either competition or
damage to the plaintiff.
14. Finchley, Inc. v. Finchly Co., 40 F.2d 736, 738 (D. Md. 1929): "In owning
a mark which enjoys such trust and confidence in relation to one article or place,
the owner possesses valuable property in the right to use that familiar and popular
mark, or name, in the extension of his business to new lines of goods and to new
territory."

